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Abstract: In this paper I discuss shame and its connection to sense, the self, and public 
interaction. I take aim, in particular, at the account of shame put forth by David Velleman in his 
essay, “The Genesis of Shame.” His account is not only conceptually problematic, but it 
threatens to eclipse the bones and blood of humanity with the anesthesia of ahistorical 
intellectualism. Shame is a matter of taste and feeling that is concerned with that part of 
humanity that presents itself through the humanity of others around us. Throughout the paper I 
balance my critique of Velleman, which I see as symptomatic of modern liberal individualism, 
with other pictures of man as found in ancient Greek literature. Our sense of shame, in the end, 





In this paper I discuss shame and its connection to sense, the self, and public interaction. I 
take aim, in particular, at the account of shame put forth by David Velleman in his essay, “The 
Genesis of Shame.” His account is not only conceptually problematic, but it threatens to eclipse 
the bones and blood of humanity with the anesthesia of ahistorical intellectualism. Shame is a 
matter of taste and feeling that is concerned with that part of humanity that presents itself 
through the humanity of others around us. Throughout the paper I balance my critique of 
Velleman, which I see as symptomatic of modern liberal individualism, with other pictures of 
man as found in ancient Greek literature. Our sense of shame, in the end, is our sense of 
humanity. 
An Old Portrait 
For a poem about a war between the Greeks and Trojans, the Iliad begins on a curious 
note: instead of combat and slaughter, it opens with Greek leaders bickering over prizes. It starts 
when Chryses, a priest of Apollo, approaches the Greeks and offers them “countless ransoms” 
(τ᾽ ἀπερείσι᾽ ἄποινα) in exchange for his daughter, whom they had kidnapped. He asks them, 
moreover, to accept the ransoms out of reverence for Zeus’ son Apollo (ἁζόµενοι Διὸς υἱὸν 
ἑκηβόλον Ἀπόλλωνα). All the Panachaeans present respond, “Respect the priest, accept the 
shining ransom!”1 However, Chryseis, the priest’s daughter, was awarded to Agamemnon. So, 
rather than hand his τιµή over, he refuses the exchange, sends Chryses off with harsh words, and 
commands him never to return. On his own Chryses is powerless against Agamemnon. But one 
                                                
1  Homer, Iliad, trans. Robert Fagles (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 1.23. ἔνθ᾽ ἄλλοι µὲν 
πάντες ἐπευφήµησαν Ἀχαιοὶ 




he leaves the camp, he prays to Apollo for retribution, and Zeus’ son sends a plague down on the 
Achaeans.  
After ten days of suffering, Achilles assembles the Greeks and suggests that they might 
want to go back home, or at least figure out why Apollo is angry. The seer Calchas rises before 
the Greeks and promises to name the cause on the condition that Achilles promises to protect 
him in return. Achilles agrees, and Calchas discloses the cause, Agamemnon’s treatment of 
Chryses. Now pressed to end the plague, an upset Agamemnon responds,  
But I am willing to give her back, even so, 
If that is best for all. What I really want 
Is to keep my people safe, not see them dying.  
But fetch me another prize, and straight off too,  
Else I alone of the Argives go without my honor.  
That would be a disgrace. You are all witness,   
Look – my prize is snatched away.2 
 
It is easy to see Agamemnon as something of a spoiled, immature character. After all, faced with 
the knowledge that he can save the Greeks by simply surrendering Chryseis, he gets testy and 
demands compensation. Even his initial treatment of Chryses can come across as if he were 
facing a clear-cut decision and then simply making the wrong one. The situation, though, is 
much more than a question, answer, and discussion – it is an intricate dance of power performed 
at the spur of the moment and that has lasting consequences. The scene not only showcases the 
role that honor, wealth, and shame played for the “Homeric Greeks”, it tells us something about 
shame in general. 
First, it is a struggle to balance power, interest, and right.3 Here, to gain or to lose honor 
is not simply a matter of esteem or regard, it is also a matter of maintaining the social balance 
                                                
2 Homer, 1.116-120. 
3 This point is more or less a reformulation of Donna F. Wilson’s argument. Cf. Ransom, 




through the material balance of τιµή.4 On the one hand, Agamemnon is an elite Greek leader, a 
member of the house of Atreus, and a king. As a member of the elite, his status is more or less 
settled in regard to his subjects – neither party would compete with one another for dominance. 
Their role is to be loyal, and his is to rule well. His relationship to Achilles, however, is not 
settled – the two contest, beat, and check one another. The aim of these conflicts, according to 
Wilson, is securing τιµή. In this system, wealth is wrested from others according to each 
participant’s display of skill. 
Chryses’ status is only partially known when he approaches the ship. It is known that he 
is a priest, a father, and a victim. As a priest he comes bearing a staff for Apollo. As a father he 
asks for his dear child (παῖδα φίλην). As a victim he offers countless ransoms. Chryses, at first 
blush, might not make much of an impact on the Greeks, who know neither the opening word of 
the epic nor what anything that they do will yield. They, therefore, base their actions on their 
interpretations of what is known and conjectures about the unknown. For instance, as Wilson 
points out, the names they call Chryseis reflect their interests and their attempt to influence what 
she will become. 
 Moreover, all of this takes place as a public event. Agamemnon has been addressed by 
and is responding to Chryses, then Calchas, then Achilles. Nevertheless, he is still interacting 
with all of the Greeks present. So when he says “What I really want / is to keep my people safe, 
not see them dying,” those people, his equals and subordinates, are physically present, 
surrounding him, watching and hearing him and learning about how he handles pressure. 
                                                
4 The Greek τιµή compasses “honor,” “esteem,” “authority,” “dignity,” “worth,” “value,” 
“price,” “payment,” “compensation,” “offering,” “penalty” and “estimation”; its verbal form, 




 Even though Agamemnon does not feel shame, he is acting under the threat of it: he is 
responding to its possibility. Shame as an occurrence is the anguish caused by depreciation.  This 
episode is significant for a study of shame because it displays what it means for shame to be a 
disposition, i.e., as informing how one lives one’s life.  
Shame’s conditions are necessarily environmental, social, and particular. The proper 
conditions for shame arise only with certain people and in certain situations: just because some 
situation is shameful for one person, does not mean it would be for someone else. Additionally, 
shame requires, as Hume suggests, human transaction.5 It requires not just formal conditions but 
physical content; not just judgments and beliefs, but intuitions and interactions. Shame is both a 
disposition and a feeling – it is both a sense and an emotion, and its expression attests to one’s 
membership in a community. Shame binds communities together and works to perpetuate the 
aspects of its order that are most revered. 
Shame of the Self-Presenter 
 
David Velleman offers a Kantian account of shame that is interesting but ultimately 
misguided. His account is in opposition to what he calls the “standard philosophical analysis of 
shame,” which claims that shame is essentially concerned with “an assessment of the self in 
terms of ethics, honor, etiquette, or other specific dimensions of personal excellence.”6 Instead, 
he claims, shame is a response to being undermined in one’s self-presentation. He defines shame 
in the following way: “In my view, shame is anxiety that we feel about a threat to our socially 
recognized status as self-presenting creatures, a status that ultimately rests on the structure of a 
free will, in virtue of which we qualify as persons”; it is an “anxiety that cannot be allayed by a 
                                                
5 Hume, David, “Of Eloquence,” in Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 1987), 97. 
6 Velleman, David, “The Genesis of Shame,” in Self to Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University 




sense of personal excellence”; and it is “the anxious sense of being compromised in one’s self 
presentation in a way that threatens one’s social recognition as a self-presenting person.”7 
 Self-presentation is the process of considering motivations for action, choosing one of 
these motivations, and then enacting it by virtue of choosing it. To self-present is to act for the 
sake of being recognizable as autonomous. Autonomy is the freedom to determine one’s actions 
over and against natural inclinations. Velleman’s understanding of autonomy is that it is an 
individual’s capacity to adjudicate between a number of inclinations for action present at a given 
time, select one, and then carry it into action by virtue of this selection. In other words, 
autonomy, for Velleman, is not the capacity to create reasons for action, but rather it is the 
capacity to turn considerations into reasons for action.  Humans self-present whereas other 
animals do not, because humans are autonomous whereas other animals are not. If a dog has the 
impulse to do something, it does it. Although a dog may be loyal, it cannot be considerate. This 
is because being considerate requires being able to disobey impulses, which is to say that it 
requires the capacity to limit one’s behavior. Considerate actions are performed for reasons that 
transcend their sensory return. For example, boxers display considerate behavior since they fight 
according to rules. Dogs, however, do not fight according to rules. 
 In order to participate in social interaction, for Velleman, one’s behavior must present 
one “as aiming to be recognized as” social, and it must be recognized as such.8 This means that 
when two people interact with each other socially they are responding to each other as reasons 
themselves. They treat each other as “considerations that are authoritative in the sense that their 
                                                
7 Velleman, John David, introduction to Self to Self: Selected Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 10. 




practical import is common knowledge among all reasoners.”9 In other words, they mutually 
recognize each other as being creatures that act for the sake of reasons. Mutually recognized 
parties qualify for social interaction because they can be expected to consider rational 
expectations and regulate their behavior accordingly. They respect each other as equals. 
 For Velleman, respect is different from esteem, and it is elemental in the experience of 
shame. Respect is appreciation for what all people have in common, viz. rational autonomy or 
“bare personhood.”10 Esteem is appreciation for what sets people apart from others, for one’s 
individuating character traits, social roles, and personal attributes. Velleman posits that respect is 
more fundamental than esteem. He does this on the grounds that individuating aspects of oneself 
can only be evaluated if the value of being a person in general is presupposed. Being a person in 
general must be valued if someone’s type of person is to have value one way or the other. 
 Self-presentation attests to one’s autonomy and thereby presents oneself as worthy of 
respect. Self-presentation, since it requires the capacity to consider and disobey impulses, 
necessarily creates a public self and a separate, private self.11 The private self consists of 
motivations for action that are not acted upon as well as anything else that one does not or cannot 
disclose to others. One’s public self consists of all that other people know about oneself, whether 
one chooses to make it public or not; for instance, the fact that one has parents is part of one’s 
public persona no matter what, but the fact that one is hungry can be concealed. Privacy 
evidences autonomy because it manifests the efficaciousness of one’s will – if I can choose to 
disclose or conceal something about myself, then I must be autonomous to some extent, which 
                                                
9 Velleman, John David, “A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics,” Self to Self: Selected Essays 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 43. 
10 Intro., 9. 




means I should be treated as such, i.e., respected. Self-presentation is compromised when the 
split between one’s private self and one’s public self is stripped of its practical reality.  
 Velleman cites frontal male nudity as being naturally more shameful than frontal female 
nudity and explains this inequality in terms of self-presentation. He writes, “Male nudity is more 
shameful because it is more explicit … in the sense that a man’s outside is liable to reveal his 
feeling in a particularly explicit way, whether he likes it or not.”12 The claim is that erections are 
overt barometers of covert sexual feelings that express their measurement whether or not their 
expression is willed; women’s anatomy lack such overt barometers. An erection is like a sneeze 
in that it is heteronomous, but it is unlike a sneeze in that it expresses feelings whose expression 
must be limited or restrained in order for social interaction to occur. The repression of sexual 
feelings is required for social interaction. Failure to abide by this requirement is evidence, 
supposedly, of a failure to respond to reasons, of a failure to behave autonomously, and so it is 
evidence against one’s eligibility as a respectable member of a community: failures to respect the 
personhood of others are failures to respect one’s own personhood, and without respect for 
personhood a rational community of persons is impossible. “The naked man,” Velleman writes, 
“is unable to choose which of his impulses are to be public; and so he is only partly an embodied 
will and partly also the embodiment of untrammeled instincts.”13 The shamefulness of male 
nakedness is deemed by Velleman to be naturally shameful because, unlike a clothed male or a 
female clothed or otherwise, a naked male’s ability to conceal his feelings is compromised 
simply because of his anatomy. 
                                                
12 Ibid., 56. 




Velleman’s also accounts for what he calls inchoate shame, which is a moment of shame 
in which one is not ashamed of anything in particular.14 Some contingent causes of inchoate 
shame include racist remarks, being put in a pillory, and forced public performances.15 In 
situations such as these, a subject may reasonably be shame because he or she is treated by others 
as less than autonomous. In the first instance, to be the victim of a racist remark is to be treated 
as determined by one’s race instead of oneself. In the second instance, pillories constrain one’s 
physical capacity to self-present, which compromises one’s status as such a creature. In the third 
instance, being forced to perform in front of others can be perceived as a threat to one’s standing 
as a self-presenter because such a performance presents a public persona that contradicts one’s 
will. 
Another way of expressing Velleman’s account of shame is to say that it is a response to 
feeling objectified, rightly or wrongly, by others and anticipating continued objectification by 
them. To be treated as an object is to be handled, managed, or used – it is to be stripped of one’s 
dignity. An exposed erection is naturally suited for shame in this account because the objectivity 
of one’s body as a biologically determined system overshadows one’s subjectivity. A failure of 
self-presentation is an uncontrolled fusion between one’s private and public selves. At the end of 
his article, Velleman suggests that we should cultivate our sense of what should be private if we 
want to regain our sense of shame.  
 
Letting Deigh Reply 
 
Velleman includes John Deigh’s account of shame, as it is presented in “Shame and Self-
Esteem: A Critique,” with the philosophical accounts of shame he finds problematic. However, 
                                                
14 Ibid., 64. 




Velleman’s account does not address Deigh’s position directly. It is curious that he ignores the 
particulars of Deigh’s stance, because Deigh’s position contains an implicit challenge to 
Velleman’s account in reference to assumptions about personal worth and the kind of worth that 
shame invokes. 
“Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique” critiques what he presents as the “Rawlsian” stance 
on shame: that shame is a reaction to the loss of self-esteem. Self-esteem in this account is “the 
ratio of one’s successes to one’s pretentions,” it accrues to directed actions, and it requires a 
constellation of values that structures one’s life.16 So, in this view, whether or not my goals or 
actions are in concert with these values determines my self-esteem. Moreover, in order to act 
with or against one’s values, one must first of all be able to conceive of oneself as giving 
direction to one’s life. This is because if one is going to esteem oneself for, say, writing a good 
book, then one must be able to trace the book’s quality and existence back to oneself as being 
responsible for it. 
This kind of self-esteem based account relies on the presupposition of an “auteur theory 
of worth.”17 The auteur theory of worth locates the source of one’s worth in the split between 
authorship and ownership, which is analogous to the division between autonomous and 
heteronomous actions.18 Ownership is one’s inseparability from one’s actions or behavior, 
whereas authorship is a special relationship to actions or behavior where one is able to identify 
oneself as its source. So, one has ownership of both autonomous and heteronomous actions, but 
one only has authorship in relation to autonomous actions. Authorship can be claimed or 
disclaimed, and it is often disclaimed for actions where passions guided one’s actions – this is 
                                                
16 Deigh, John, “Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique,” Ethics (1983), 227-28. 
17 Ibid., 241. 




reflected in excuses like “The devil made me do it” or “He wasn’t feeling himself.”19 
Disclaiming authorship is a way of distancing one’s present self from one’s past actions that 
often works, e.g., we judge ‘crimes of passion’ less severely than ‘cold-blooded’ crimes. 
As Deigh writes, “[the auteur theory of worth] is based on a conception of us as the 
authors of our actions.”20 The problem with this theory, though, is that it ignores or underplays 
other significant sources of worth. Deigh expresses these other sources in the following way: 
…we might say that a person’s worth is determined by his status in the context of 
some social hierarchy. The salient feature here is that one’s status, and so one’s 
worth, is fixed independently of one’s conduct. To be sure, one can change classes 
through marriage or cultures through immigration, but short of this the general 
conduct of one’s life, that is, however well or badly one conducts it, does not 
increase or decrease the worth that is attributed to one because of one’s status. 
And pretty much the same holds of worth that is attributed to human beings 
because of their species or to persons because of the kind of beings they are 
conceived to be: rational ones, say, spiritual ones, or autonomous ones. That is, 
worth attributed to one because of one’s essential nature is, like worth attributed 
to one because of one’s status, fixed independently of how one conducts one’s 
life.21 
This passage gives voice to the essential underpinning of Velleman’s account while 
simultaneously undermining it. This is the claim that matters of character qualities, personal 
excellence, and honor cannot, on their own, ground a shame response. This is because the value 
of these character attributes, e.g. whether being greedy or lusty is cause for shame or not, is only 
intelligible in the light of the more constant and fixed value of personhood. Being seen as greedy, 
for Velleman, is not shameful because it signifies a failure in one’s pursuit of excellence, but 
rather it is shameful because it compromises one’s very social standing as a self-presenting 
creature. To the extent that the category of the shameful is possible only in reference to a 
constant, fixed value source, Velleman and Deigh are on the same page. And, moreover, they 
                                                
19 This is the same point that P. F. Strawson makes in his influential essay “Free and 
Resentment.” 
20 Ibid., 240. 




also agree to the extent that they both describe shame as a response to a threat instead of a loss or 
failure that causes self-disesteem.22 
In regards to the source of one’s fixed worth, though, Velleman and Deigh part ways. 
Deigh’s account acknowledges the mutability of sources of worth instead of positing a single 
source – he acknowledges that the source of one’s worth is integrally embedded in one’s socio-
historical pretext. Everyone is, to some degree, the ‘author’ of her life. However, the text that she 
produces is only meaningful within a broader pretext and context over which she has little 
control. Experiencing shame, anticipating shame, and regulating one’s life so as to avoid shame 
all betray, to use Deigh’s phrase, “an acute sense of who [one] is,” which requires reference to 
one’s socio-historical context.23 
This is captured by Alexis de Tocqueville. He illuminates the significance of pretext for 
identity and worth when he writes,  
Amongst aristocratic nations, it often happens that the condition of domestic 
service does not degrade the character of those who enter upon it, because they 
neither know nor imagine any other; and the amazing inequality which is manifest 
between them and their master appears to be the necessary and unavoidable 
consequence of some hidden law of Providence.24 
In an historically aristocratic society, where class is determined by ancestry and the aristocratic 
order is understood as required, there is no need to predicate one’s worth on bare personhood. 
Such a social system, like all social orders, presupposes one’s personhood as a necessary 
condition of occupying a position in society in the first place. How one is actually related to 
others becomes the source of persons, and since these relations are largely out of one’s control 
                                                
22 Ibid., 242. He suggests that “we should conceive of shame, not as a reaction to a loss, but as a 
reaction to a threat, specifically, the threat of demeaning treatment one would invite in giving the 
appearance of someone of lesser worth.” 
23 Ibid., 235. 
24 De Tocqueville, Alexis, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (Cambridge, MA: Stever 




they are fixed and necessary as far as oneself is concerned. Each person is an embodiment of his 
class, and each class has traditional obligations, values, opinions, and beliefs that define it and 
regulate its members conduct within and between classes. So, although it might be shameful for 
a member of the nobility to become a slave, it would not be shameful for a slave to be a slave. 
And, moreover, enslavement would not be shameful for a member of the aristocracy because she 
feels that it compromises her self-presentation, but rather it would be shameful because it just is 
shameful for someone like her to act and be treated like a slave. Part of what it means to be a 
member of the nobility is to be honored as such and another part is being ashamed of being 
slavish. 
 This model of identity and worth hinges on a relationship between who one is and how 
one is seen. Who one is, moreover, is understood in terms of one’s socio-historical position. As 
Deigh expresses it, this model posits “a sense of worth that comes from knowing one’s status or 
essential nature [that] reflects congruency between one’s conduct or appearance and one’s real 
worth.”25 It is important, here, to understand the intimacy of the relationship between appearance 
and reality. Appearances are not contingent representations of some deeper, more obscure, or 
hidden self or self-system; instead, they are presentations of how one really is who one really is. 
Appearances are also public and vary in meaning depending on who sees them, just as the 
significance of who one really is varies depending on the members of an interaction.  
Velleman, as stated earlier, locates the fixed source of value in one’s “bare personhood.” 
By citing this as the source, Velleman’s account ostensibly supplies a deep, timeless, and 
necessary source of personal value in light of which one’s particular social standing becomes 
valuable. In effect, this results in a slightly more sophisticated version of Rawlsian shame. 
                                                




Velleman’s account is based on a variation on the auteur theory of worth that divorces author 
from content and text from pre-text. To be a self-presenter is to be an author; to be recognized as 
a self-presenter is to be attributed authorship with only contingent regard given to what is 
written, i.e., how one acts. In the end, this account, with all of its concern for timelessness, 
autonomy, and universal value, is timely and political – it is an example of modern liberalism. 
On this point, Deigh’s description of Rawls’s account applies to Velleman’s as well:26  
[It is] an attractive characterization of the shame felt by persons who are relatively 
free of constraints on their choice of life pursuits owing to class, race, ethnic 
origins, and the like. For such persons tend to regard their aims and ideals as 
constituting their identity and their ancestry, race, class, and so forth as extrinsic 
facts about themselves.”27 
This correlates to the division Velleman draws between one’s individuating self-conception and 
the concept of bare personhood. One’s personhood, as he would have, stands over and against 
the contingent facts about oneself that one represents in thinking about who one is in particular. 
This personhood, too, is posited as applying equally to all people at all times insofar as they 
exhibit rational behavior – the worth that it accords is likewise equal and unchanging. 
 The ideal and selfsame worth of personhood conceived of in terms of autonomy is a 
historically and culturally contingent fiction. Here again Tocqueville’s writing on American 
democracy is illuminating: 
When the greater part of the community have long attained a condition nearly 
alike, and when equality is an old and acknowledged fact, the public mind, which 
is never affected by exceptions, assigns certain general limits to the value of man, 
above or below which no man can long remain placed. It is in vain that wealth 
and poverty, authority and obedience, accidentally interpose great distances 
between two men; public opinion, founded upon the usual order of things, draws 
them to a common level, and creates a species of imaginary equality between 
them, in spite of the real inequality of their conditions. This all-powerful opinion 
penetrates at length even into the hearts of those whose interest might arm them to 
resist it; it affects their judgment, whilst it subdues their will. 
                                                
26 Deigh’s description applies to Rawls for different reasons than it does to Velleman.  




Granting bare personhood the ultimate worth that Velleman claims it has requires turning a blind 
eye to the original, material, socio-political inequality between people – or, if it doesn’t ignore it, 
it grossly underplays its significance. It is also in the ruling classes interest to maintain 
fundamental equality between persons. It alleviates the conscience of the privileged by assuring 
oneself that, in the end, all men are equal and have immutable worth as humans, that rational 
action stands over and above material conditions, that every man is his own authority, and that 
all men have equal rights. These assumptions, however, also present man to himself as a 
fundamentally isolated creature. His value is hardly indebted to his patrimony, and his ideal self 
– the person of bare personhood – is the negation of everything about him that makes him rare. 
According to Velleman, so long as he acts coherently he is worthy of respect. The rich and the 
poor, the high and the low, in this system, are equals, requiring no more and no less from each 
other than their peers. Its primal dictum is to live dispassionately and to act according to the 
concept of personhood. It does not recognize the contingency of the contents of the concept of 
personhood, that what it means to be a person changes over time and between people. 
 At the end of the day, the problem with an account of shame like Velleman’s is that it 
creates an illusory equality between men. It depicts people as first and foremost discrete entities 
whose belonging, whose very humanity, is not guaranteed. Shame, as he paints it, is concerned 
with a threat regarding something that cannot be lost, one’s necessary identity as a person. Social 
disqualification on the grounds of a failure to self-present is an impossibility. This is because 
humans raised in, by, and with other humans simply cannot fail to self-present. Any single 
moment judged to be a failure of self-presentation presupposes a prior and continuous success at 
self-presentation. Additionally, Velleman’s account of shame cannot explain instances where one 




Social disqualification is a fiction that preys on the assumption of one’s isolation from 
others, from one’s ancestors, one’s contemporaries, one’s future, and one’s progeny. For social 
disqualification to be a legitimate threat it would take more than just being ignored, overly 
praised, maltreated, or inadvertently exposed. In any instance where such things as these may 
happen, one can only be seen by a finite audience in an equally finite situation, and no such 
audience has the power to revoke one’s social membership. At most, one can be rejected from or 
discredited in this or that part of the social sphere to varying degrees. And to be discredited or 
rejected in some way is itself a form of social interaction – to feel shame, to express it, in these 
kinds of situations, moreover, testifies to one’s sociality because it displays one’s humanity.  
Velleman’s Self 
 
Strictly speaking, Velleman does not believe that there is a single self. Instead, he claims 
that there are three “reflexive guises” under which different selves are represented: “the self-
concept, the guise of past or future self, and the guise of the self as cause of autonomous 
action.”28 The first and third types of guise are of importance for understanding Velleman’s 
position on shame. The first guise, the self-concept, are the object of self-esteem, and an 
individual’s self-concept consists of “representing those features of himself which he values as 
differentiating him from others.”29 In other words, it is a representation of one’s particularized 
identity as comprised of facts and character qualities. Velleman emphasizes the representational 
and objective quality of one’s self-conception when he describes it in the following way: “It is 
like a photograph in the subject’s mental album, showing just another person but bearing on the 
                                                
28 Introduction, 8-9. 




reverse side ‘This is me.’”30 This snapshot, as it were, is fictious, and yet it can serve as a basis 
for the determination of behavior.31 
The third guise, the self as cause of autonomous action, is the self that gets credited with 
electing and thereby causing one’s behavior.32 The ascription of autonomy involves but is 
ultimately independent from the particular actions or modes of behavior that comprise one’s self-
conception. The ascription of autonomy is the epistemic principle of coherence, and specifically, 
of “agential coherence.”33 The idea here is that in order to reflect on any action as performed by 
oneself, one must identify oneself with the cause of the action by virtue of merely willing it to be 
done. This process of reflexive identification with the cause of an action simultaneously posits 
one’s own will as a coherent, singular cause whose poser lies in turning possible motivations for 
action into reasons for action. 
Acts of self-presentation present not just fodder for one’s self-conception, but they also 
present oneself as a self that acts for reasons. In doing so, self-presentation presupposes both the 
agential unity of one’s will as well as the disclosure of this unity in one’s behavior as a testament 
to one’s coherence as a rational agent. Hence, failures of self-presentation imply the illegibility 
of one’s autonomy and thereby threaten the intelligibility of one’s behavior. 
Significantly, for Velleman, there is no such thing as a single, persisting self. Instead, 
there are different selves created by the act of reflection itself. In his account, “self” is 
synonymous with “perspective,” and it is as prone to variations as perspectives are to changing. 
                                                
30 Intro., 3. 
31 Intro., 6. Velleman offers a robust account of a self-conception’s imaginary nature and this 
nature’s efficaciousness in “The Self as Narrator.”  
32 See “From Self Psychology to Moral Philosophy” and “Motivation by Ideal.” 




This reduction of self to perspective and personhood to the formal capacity for rationality creates 
a chasm between self and world, effectively uprooting the personal from the interpersonal.  
Shame and Sense 
 
 In his essay “Recognition,” Axel Honneth postulates that the origin of the feeling of 
dignity and respect for others’ dignity begins when an infant sees a caregiver’s smile. This smile 
is taken as standing in “symbolic abbreviation” for goodwill, i.e., that he or she will care for us, 
that he or she loves us and will protect us.34 In this story, the root of dignity is deeply visual; in 
fact, dignity is something “visible” in a nuanced, social sense of the word. The same holds for 
Velleman’s take on the dignity implicated or compromised in shame. I feel shame, according to 
Velleman, either when I see someone see me as less than socially visible or when I see myself as 
unable to be seen as a social participant. While how we are seen by others is certainly implicated 
in shame, any account that rests in a crucial way on the sense of vision tends to become highly 
cerebral and aflutter with jargon-saturated explanations and definitions. A more intuitive 
understanding of the source of personal dignity, how this source becomes necessarily embedded 
in a social context, and the content of shame is begins with equilibrioception and proprioception. 
  A common assumption regarding the senses is that there are five: sight, smell, hearing, 
touch, and taste. This is problematic for (1) its superficiality and (2) its tendency to reify senses. 
This list of five leaves out at least two other primary senses of ours: equilibrioception and 
proprioception.35 Equilibrioception is our sense of balance, which we share with at least all other 
ambulatory animals and which we may share analogically with all motile organisms. 
                                                
34 Honneth, Axel and Avishai Margalit, “Recognition,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Issues (2001), 118, 124-126. 
35 Other senses might include the sense implicated by the feeling of a rumbling voice box, the 
feeling of one’s own heart’s beating, the internal pressure of gas, the overwhelming sensation 




Proprioception is our sense of self-awareness, of where we are in relation to ourselves.36 It is our 
sense of embodiment, which we share on some level with anything that responds to stimuli. 
 Equilibrioception stands out from the standard five senses in that it obscures the different 
between inside and outside, internal and external, subject and object. The ‘object’ of our sense of 
balance is the sophisticated and ongoing relationship between ourselves and our terrain. This 
relationship is sophisticated for the same reason that I put object in scare quotes: from the 
perspective of balance, my body and my surroundings form an intimate, inseparable unity, a 
gestalt. Vision, hearing, taste, touch, and feeling afford causal description.37 I can easily talk 
about what I see or taste in subject-object terms, where the cause of my experience is mainly due 
to something that I posit as external to myself. The senses themselves can be treated as foreign to 
oneself – it becomes vision’s fault that I see an illusion, not my own. 
 Balancing whilst standing or sitting is something that we are always already doing – this 
is what the drunkard ‘loses.’ Nevertheless, the sense of balance doesn’t become an issue until it 
breaks down; there is no positive, physical sensation that accompanies keeping one’s balance, 
but there is one when it is upset. Yet equilibrioception is always there, even if only in the 
background or just offstage.38 We can lose our balance at any given time. It can also be taken 
                                                
36 Proprioception includes but need not be limited to kinesthesia, the awareness of our motion, 
weight, momentum, etc. 
37 Here, I am using causal with emphasis on its Latin root, causa, which means “origin,” 
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aware that whatever they achieved could vanish in a trice, and the death, 




from us. The issue that equilibrioception establishes in concreto is maintaining the delicate 
balance between oneself and one’s environment. 
Aside from exceptional cases, people do not constantly check in with their sense of 
balance as they, say, hold a conversation, watch a painting, or check the time. The sense of 
balance is always in play. It is in play while we see, while we smell, while we eat, feel, and 
listen. And, moreover, we necessarily use other senses in conjunction with equilibrioception. 
Arguably, one of vision’s most fundamental, practical roles is its service to our sense of balance. 
We survey our surroundings in order to gauge our comportment. When we see slippery stairs, we 
brace ourselves, grab a railing, or proceed with caution and pay attention to the details of our 
movement and the distribution of our weight. Here, too, our propriocetion becomes more 
sensitive. We are more aware of our center of gravity, how we are shifting our weight, where our 
feet and hands are. Being human means being embodied, which means being as embodied. 
 Equilibrioception is integrally related to proprioception: they are needed to qualify one 
another. This relationship of mutual qualification is itself a sense that is different from either. 
This is our sense of stability. On the one hand, this ‘hybrid’ sense is our concrete awareness of 
how we are embodied, e.g., as upright, as stable on two feet, etc. On the other hand, it is of what 
is balancing, e.g., that I am my body and that, as such, I can fall down. Moreover, our other 
senses are in a constant state coalescence with each other, including our sense of stability and 
balance, such that we always already have a complex sense, an ‘interpretation,’ of our experience 
before we reflect on any sense in particular.  
 Sensation is somehow identical with interpretation. We speak of senses in this way, e.g., 
a sense of responsibility, a sense of self-doubt, a sense of danger, a sense of shame, a sense of 




impending doom, a sense of obligation, a sense of guilt, a sense of honor, a sense of propriety, a 
sense of reverence, a sense of accomplishment, a sense of identity, a sense of urgency, a sense of 
safety, a sense of satisfaction, etc. All of these forms of sense include a hermeneutic element that 
makes them non-mechanical. So long as sense and perception are conceived of in mechanical 
terms as media or the like, the consciousness of human sensuousness will seem foreign. 
Divorcing sense and judgment, which is a natural union, establishes nonsense as the mark of 
judgments and unintelligibility as the nature of sensuousness. So long as sense and judgment are 
recognized as either half of the same arch, the self remains in tact as portal that they open. 
However, when they are treated as separate functions and the arch is dismantled, the self’s very 
existence and unity is called into question. Hence, personhood may cease being treated as 
achieving definition and distinction throughout her lifelong relationship with the world. Instead, 
via the divorce of sense and judgment, the person may be treated as affording definition through 
deduction; in addition, it may be treated like a universal force like gravity. The identification of 
human beings with autonomy and rationality are forms of the later – the person is an author, a 
self-presenter. 
Return to Troy 
In the Chryseis scene, we watch the Greeks as they perform a balancing act. Each 
character is attempting to maintain the balance of something greater than he while at the same 
time caring for his own interests. But the players are humans and as such they are prone to their 
own natures and ignorance. None of the characters that we hear of have our view of their 
situation. They do not know the ins and outs of their context, nor do they know how they appear 




Agamemnon in particular finds himself in a complicated situation. It is unclear who has 
more of a right to Chryseis, her father or her captor. It is clear, though, that Agamemnon as 
victor and leader has the right to refuse Chryses’ ἄποινα. However, it is only his right as long as 
he has the upper hand. He miscalculates the terrain, though, and thinks that his position is more 
stable than it turns out to be. When his hold on the situation begins to slip, he is forced to regain 
his balance. Then, as Donna F. Wilson puts it, “Agamemnon must find a way to give what he 
cannot keep, namely, Chryseis, so as to keep what he will not and cannot afford to surrender, 
namely, belief in the legitimacy of his privileged position in the fixed system [of the social 
order].”39 
So, we are right in seeing Agamemnon as ignorant or foolish. He is ignorant of what will 
happen when he acts like a ruler and refuses Chryses’ offer. He is foolish because he opposes the 
expressed wishes of his audience, whose allegiance constitute his power, without winning them 
over. But then again, it would be foolish of a ruler not to exercise his power as a ruler when he 
feels compelled to do so. But then again again, it would be foolish of us to think that 
Agamemnon’s behavior is foolish in general. There are times when it is best to accept ransoms, 
and times to refuse them; there are times when it is best to act like a parent, and times to act like 
a peer; there are times when it is best to obey rules, and times to break them. Unfortunately, what 
a given situation calls for may be hard to hear. In addition, we are all hard of hearing. 
We might feel like dismissing Agamemnon, like he did Chryses, when we watch him act 
as he does. When we do, we feel like condemning him, because we feel as if he deserves our 
response. This is foolishness on our part – we play the part of the fool. Or at least we are set up 
to play the fool’s role. This is because Agamemnon deserves to be treated in such a way as much 
                                                




as Chryses deserves his treatment. Thinking that Agamemnon is immature, then, is an expression 
of one’s own immaturity.  
An alternative response to Agamemnon’s conduct in this scene, especially given our 
foreknowledge of the fate that awaits him, is a sense of the fragility of human life. Odysseus 
reacts in this way when he beholds Ajax in the throes of madness and says, 
I pity his misfortune under that yoke 
of catastrophic madness. It makes me think   
not just of his fate but my own as well. 
I see that in our lives we are no more 
than phantoms, insubstantial shadows.40 
 
Odysseus’ reaction gives expression to the origin source of human worth and dignity: love for 
human as is. The inverse, the source of human worthlessness is, according to a doctor as told by 
Zosima, “’I love mankind,’ he said, ‘but I am amazed at myself: the more I love mankind in 
general, the less I love people in particular, that is, individually, as separate persons.”41  
Jack’s First Invention 
 Suppose there was a Jack who was friends with an Indiana. Suppose Indiana bought a 
ring from a pawn shop, that the ring was Gyges’, and that he lost sight of himself as quickly as 
the ring got stuck between his knuckles. Suppose that Gyges’ ring silenced Indiana’s voice, and 
crippled his body such that he could walk but had neither strength nor dexterity. Indiana becomes 
confused and scared, but his confused terror lightens greatly when he sees Jack coming his way 
with an old oil can. Indiana then finds that Jack can’t see him or any trace of him even though 
he’s looking right at him. Indiana begins bumping into Jack and knocking him around and off 
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balance. At first Jack just loses his balance – “That was weird.” – then again and again, and the 
more it happens the less it surprises him.  
Under the influence of a recent Sci-fi movie binge, Jack interprets his sloppy walking 
absurdly: he imagines a large, highly camouflaged alien puppy nudging him to play. Taken by 
the vividness of the scene, without really thinking about it, he starts dashing oil out in the air 
around him. And, out of nowhere, much to Jack’s own confusion and terror, an oil coated 
Indiana appeared before his eyes. After he and the oil helped liberate Indiana, Jack went home 
and made his first invention. He called it “Concealer-Revealer” which consisted of oil in a can 
and which could be used to make visible what could be felt but not seen. The function, more or 
less, was to make more sense out of one’s experience. This is the primary role of many works of 
art as well as superfluous items of clothing – it protects and gives content to our feelings of 
dignity or worth. In removing someone’s clothing or in being seen naked, for example, nothing 
leaves, no spirits flutter out of Pandora’s box, but something is lost. This something, though, may 
really be a nothing that exists insofar as we make it exists, i.e., as long as we treat the world like 
it is present. 
Conclusion 
 There is something lacking in the examples of shame that Velleman provides in “The 
Genesis of Shame” as well as in his understanding of the self: the richness, complexity, and 
ambiguity of reality. For the most part, he uses arbitrary, stock characters whose involvement in 
other situations and names we never learn. They are ahistorical and cultureless, and the scenarios 
they are involved in are more like green screens than actual environments.  
 Velleman presents the self as a series of discrete representations of oneself. He 




to be a self in isolation from the contributions of pubic, social interactions. Hence, he is lead to 
the conclusion that there is no single self – the self, though, is a public creation, and so it cannot 
be created by the individual. We see this in the Iliad: neither Chryseis nor Agamemnon is the 
author of the self for which they are responsible and with which they identify. The privative 
theory of the self that Velleman perpetuates is the common standard of American individualism 
as well as some brands of Christian morality. However, such notions of the self, when they are 
assumed to be the way things “really are,” create a mendacious illusion that can sicken the spirit. 
The problem is that they present the self as something private for which the community at large 
is not responsible and something that is not responsible for the actions and lives of others in the 
community. This view, however, is but one of many voiced in the public contest regarding the 
interpretation of the self. We must tell each other that we are private individuals and treat each 
other as such in order for us to become them – in this respect, we are not unlike Agamemnon and 
Chryseis whose identities are up in the air and must be nailed down by each other for each other 
in order for them to become a reality. The self is a public building that is always under 
construction. 
 The consequence of Velleman’s view of the self, which is insulated in its conception both 
from public engagement as well as separate from death (he never mentions the possibility of the 
self’s death), is that he treats shame as a private phenomenon occasioned by internal powers of 
judgment. However, the private is itself a public formation, and so if his account of shame is 
accepted, it will only make our relationship with the shameful even more abstract. It also leads 
him to relate shame to cognitive judgment as effect and cause respectively. However, shame and 
judgment are properly united within the human sense complex and, in particular, in our sense of 




correct. We do not know how to act correctly – we are forever children in this regard – however, 
we do know what looks noble and what looks base. This knowledge is not discursive; it is a 
knowledge of sense, and so it requires the development of taste and common sense rather than 
reason alone. 
We feel shame when we wittingly act against the human good and desecrate the noble 
bits of human nature. The worst thing for human good, the human project, is assuming that one 
already knows what is good – we ought to trust our feelings and passions and not keep them to 
ourselves. There is nothing so shameful as keeping honest passion to oneself for fear of 
offending reason – we owe it to each other to let the flames of our spirit burn bright and reveal 
what is most human, i.e., what this particular human is in these particular times. I’m with Sappho 
when she writes, “enough smoothness.”42 It may be time to oppose the phlegmatic passion that 
has crept in to so many of our hearts, since the lust for reason may just be the passion for the 
death of passion, a contradiction that suffocates instead of titillates our boney, bloody, fleshy 
selves. 
  
“I want to say something, but shame prevents me.” 
 
“But if your desire were for the noble and good 
and if your tongue were not brewing evil, 
shame would not turn your eyes glossy 
and you would speak out for what is right.”43 
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